RUSSIA DEPLETING SOVIET‑ERA WEAPON STOCKPILES, SAYS FIRSTFT REPORT
A recent FirstFT report has highlighted growing concerns that Russia is rapidly depleting its vast Soviet-era weapon stockpiles, raising questions about the country’s ability to sustain prolonged, high-intensity combat. For decades, Moscow relied on massive Cold War–era reserves of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and munitions to maintain its military operations. However, after over three years of heavy losses in Ukraine, analysts suggest that these stockpiles are now approaching critical exhaustion.
According to the report, the amount of equipment being pulled from Russian storage facilities has dropped sharply since 2022. Early in the war, Moscow was able to field thousands of T-72 and T-80 tanks from deep storage, as well as vast quantities of Soviet-manufactured shells. But by mid-2025, deliveries from depots had fallen by more than half compared to the first year of the conflict, suggesting that the most serviceable hardware has already been used. What remains are largely outdated or heavily degraded vehicles requiring extensive refurbishment before they can be deployed.
The problem is compounded by the scale of Russian losses. Independent estimates indicate that more than 11,000 armored vehicles and over 2,500 tanks have been destroyed or captured since the invasion began. While Russia’s defense industry has increased production, experts note that current output falls far short of replacing battlefield losses. Domestic factories can only manufacture a few dozen brand-new tanks annually, forcing Moscow to depend on reactivating older models, including T-62s and even T-55s, which lack modern protection and firepower.
Artillery is another critical weak point. Russian gun barrels and ammunition stocks are being consumed faster than they can be replaced, with some reports suggesting that older shells have high failure rates due to age and poor storage conditions. This has driven Moscow to seek external supplies. North Korea has become a major lifeline, providing hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition and even ballistic missiles to fill the gap. Iran and China have also been linked to supplying components, drones, and other military support.
Military analysts warn that if the current trend continues, Russia could reach a “point of exhaustion” by late 2025, where its ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations becomes severely limited. This potential shortfall may explain Moscow’s shift in tactics, focusing more on defensive fortifications and incremental gains rather than broad mechanized offensives. It also raises questions about Russia’s long-term strategic posture and whether the Kremlin will be forced to scale back operations or seek negotiated pauses to rebuild its arsenal.
The depletion of Soviet-era reserves underscores a deeper structural issue: Russia’s military power has long depended on inherited Cold War assets rather than sustained modern production capacity. As these reserves run dry, the limitations of its defense industry are becoming increasingly exposed. For Western allies supporting Ukraine, the report offers cautious optimism that sustained pressure could further erode Russia’s warfighting ability. However, it also highlights the risk of Moscow doubling down on alternative tactics, including asymmetric warfare and increased reliance on allied suppliers.
Ultimately, the FirstFT findings suggest that the war is entering a new phase where logistics and industrial capacity may be as decisive as battlefield maneuvers. As Russia’s once-vast stockpiles shrink, its ability to project power and sustain prolonged conflict faces its most serious test since the war began.