Political Context
In March 2025, Ahmed al‑Sharaa—former leader of Hayʾat Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS)—assumed the role of interim President after overthrowing the Assad regime. His declared mission: build an “inclusive” transitional government with representation for Syria’s minorities—including the Druze, Kurds, Christians, and Alawites—amid substantial international scrutiny
However, Druze leaders have expressed deep mistrust. Spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al‑Hijari denounced the interim government’s constitutional declaration as extremist and illegitimate, declaring “there is no understanding or agreement with the existing government in Damascus”
Statement of Priority
In the wake of Israeli airstrikes on Damascus and escalating violence in the Druze-majority region of Sweida, President al‑Sharaa issued a televised statement early on July 17, 2025, saying:
“Protecting the Druze citizens and their rights is our priority.” He rejected any effort to drag them “into the hands of an external party,” urging unity and resilience
He framed his government as willing to take legal action against abuses, regardless of the perpetrators’ rank, signaling an approach of accountability and civilian protection
Ongoing Crisis in Sweida
Since mid‑July, sectarian clashes between Druze militias and Sunni Bedouin tribes in Sweida escalated, drawing in Syrian government forces. Reported death tolls range from 166 to as high as 300, including civilians, security personnel, and children
Despite earlier ceasefires, sporadic violence—including field executions, looting, and displacement—persisted. Al‑Sharaa has demanded authorities investigate and prosecute any transgressions
Government Action & Agreements
Prior to recent violence, al‑Sharaa struck agreements with Druze leadership. In March, a deal integrated the Druze community into the state structure, allowing local policing and recognition of Druze culture under state institutions
Additionally, plans were initiated to form fact‑finding committees and transitional justice bodies to address abuses, aiming to enhance accountability and foster trust with minority communities.
Challenges and Skepticism
Despite these assurances, many Druze leaders remained wary. Hikmat al‑Hijari and others demanded genuine decentralization and minority rights—not superficial inclusion under Islamist control. They described the constitutional declaration as dangerous and exclusionary.
Some segments of the Druze rejected any partnership with Damascus entirely, characterizing it as a government untrustworthy and inaccessible to their concerns .
Regional Implications
Al‑Sharaa’s declaration of Druze protection came amid Israeli airstrikes on Damascus—purportedly to prevent regime attacks on Druze communities and Syrian military near the Golan border Israeli Druze have even mobilized across the border to aid their Syrian counterparts, pushing Israel’s leadership to vow support and safe return .
Meanwhile international actors—including the U.S., EU, and the UN—were urging ceasefires, mediation, and protection of civilians, with the U.S. meeting Syria’s new government to demand minority protections as a precondition for sanctions relief and normalization
Outlook
Al‑Sharaa’s statement elevates Druze protection to a national priority. Whether the government’s actions—such as integration agreements and oversight commissions—build trust depends on their sincerity and execution.
Given longstanding Druze skepticism, true progress likely requires meaningful autonomy, inclusive governance, and community-led security arrangements. Without these, the rhetoric may ring hollow.
If al‑Sharaa’s administration follows through and curtails abuses, his leadership may build bridges with suspended communities. If not, Druze autonomy will continue to assert itself, possibly fracturing relations with Damascus further in the volatile post‑Assad era.